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This study develops an efficiency wage model that generates a wage curve at the regional 
level and a Phillips curve at the national level, under the assumption that workers’ 
efficiency depends on both regional and aggregate labor market conditions. An equation 
relating wages to unemployment and lagged wages is derived from the profit-maximizing 
behavior of firms, and it is demonstrated that the coefficient on lagged wages is less than 
1 with regional data but equals 1 with aggregate data. In addition, there is an equilibrium 
relationship between unemployment and wages at the regional level, but not at the 
aggregate level.  
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The Phillips curve, which is a relationship between unemployment and the rate of 
change in wages or prices, has been an integral part of macroeconomic modeling since the 
publication of Phillip’s (1958) seminal paper. More recently, Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1994) argue that the relationship between unemployment and wages can be more 
accurately described by the wage curve, which is a relationship between unemployment and 
the level of real wages. Using data from many countries, Blanchflower and Oswald regress 
the log of the wage on the log of the regional and/or industry unemployment rate, and they 
find a negative relationship between unemployment and real wages. In addition, when their 
regressions include the lagged wage, its coefficient is generally small and insignificant.1
The Phillips curve and the wage curve differ in several respects. First, because the 
Phillips curve is a relationship between wage inflation and the unemployment rate, lagged 
wages should enter with a coefficient of 1 when current wages are regressed on 
unemployment and lagged wages. On the other hand, the wage curve literature predicts that 
this regression should yield a coefficient on lagged wages that is significantly less than 1. 
Second, Phillips curves are generally estimated with macroeconomic time-series data, while 
wage curves are estimated with pooled cross-section time-series data, with the dependent 
variable being either individual wages or average wages in a region or industry.2 Third, 
according to Blanchflower and Oswald (1995, p. 164), “the Phillips curve was proposed as 
a disequilibrium adjustment mechanism. … In our conception, the wage curve is an 
equilibrium locus that is a description neither of inherently temporary phenomena nor of 
transitory dynamics.”  
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This study develops a model of wage setting under the assumptions that firms pay 
efficiency wages, that workers have imperfect information about wages at other firms, and 
that workers’ efficiency depends on both regional and aggregate labor market conditions. It 
is demonstrated that the relationship between current wages, unemployment, and lagged 
wages has the characteristics of a wage curve when a regression is estimated with pooled 
microeconomic data, and has the characteristics of a Phillips curve when estimated with 
aggregate time-series data.   
The model is first developed for a local labor market. An equation is derived that 
relates regional wages to regional unemployment, lagged regional wages, aggregate unem-
ployment, and expectations of aggregate wages. The coefficient on regional unemployment 
is negative, and the coefficient on lagged regional wages lies between 0 and 1, both of 
which are in agreement with the wage curve literature. In addition, the analysis provides a 
potential explanation for the finding that the log of regional wages is more closely related to 
the log of regional unemployment than to its level. 
The model is subjected to a demand shock or series of demand shocks, and theo-
retical expressions are obtained for the paths that regional wages and unemployment follow 
over time.3 It is demonstrated that demand shocks have long-term effects on both wages 
and unemployment, so there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between these variables. 
When numerical values are chosen for the model’s parameters, the long-run elasticity of 
wages with respect to unemployment is generally close to values that have been empirically 
estimated, and this elasticity is relatively invariant to changes in most of the parameters.  
As workers place more weight on local labor market conditions (relative to 
aggregate conditions), the coefficient on lagged wages rises. In the limiting case in which 
the local labor market is assumed to be the entire economy, this coefficient equals 1. This 
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means that the rate of change in wages depends on the level of unemployment, so that the 
aggregate economy is characterized by a Phillips curve. This Phillips curve is a disequi-
librium relationship, as aggregate unemployment eventually returns to its natural rate.  
After a single regional economy and the aggregate economy are analyzed 
separately, simulations are performed for a multiregional economy in which there are 
aggregate and region-specific demand shocks in each period. In a pooled regression of 
regional wages on lagged wages and regional unemployment, the coefficient on lagged 
wages is less than 1. However, when aggregate data are created by averaging regional data, 
the coefficient on lagged wages equals 1 in the aggregate wage equation. Thus, the same 
data yield a wage curve at the local level and a Phillips curve at the aggregate level, 
showing that there is no contradiction between the wage curve and the Phillips curve.     
The reason why regional wage dynamics and aggregate wage dynamics differ is 
that, in modeling a regional economy, it is assumed that workers’ efficiency depends on 
labor market conditions both inside and outside of the economy being modeled. In contrast, 
when the aggregate economy is considered, efficiency does not depend on labor market 
conditions outside the economy.  
 
2. Relationship of the present study to past work on the wage curve and Phillips curve 
The present study differs in several important respects from previous research on the 
wage and Phillips curves. Many studies have developed models of either the wage curve or 
the Phillips curve. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) show how a wage curve relationship 
can be obtained from models involving contracts, efficiency wages, and bargaining. Models 
of the Phillips curve have been developed by Roberts (1995) and Galí and Gertler (1999) 
with staggered price contracts, Blanchard and Katz (1999) with adaptive expectations about 
reservation wages, and Mankiw and Reis (2002) with sticky information. However, none of 
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these studies considers the wage curve and the Phillips curve in a single model, so they do 
not explain why economists have found different wage dynamics at the national and 
regional levels.4  
The present study develops a model, derived from the profit-maximizing behavior 
of firms, which can explain both the wage curve and the Phillips curve.5 When workers’ 
efficiency depends on labor market conditions both inside and outside of the economy 
being considered, the relationship between wages and unemployment looks like a wage 
curve. On the other hand, the relationship looks like a Phillips curve when their efficiency 
depends on labor market conditions only within the economy being considered. Thus, this 
study provides explanations for why the wage–unemployment relationship appears to differ 
qualitatively between the regional and national levels and for why there is an equilibrium 
relationship for regional economies but not for the aggregate economy.   
Blanchard and Katz (1999) and Montuenga-Gómez and Ramos-Parreño (2005) 
discuss the possibility that workers’ behavior may be affected by both regional and national 
labor market conditions. However, these studies do not develop formal models 
incorporating this assumption and do not use this assumption to show how a wage curve at 
the local level is compatible with a Phillips curve at the national level.  
The results of Galí and Gertler (1999) suggest that wage behavior is an important 
determinant of price dynamics. They find that a Phillips curve model in which price 
inflation depends on expectations of future marginal cost (where marginal cost is measured 
by labor’s share of national income) outperforms a conventional sticky price model in 
which inflation depends on the output gap. Since the present model explains the 
determinants of wages, it may be able to explain price inflation better than Phillips curve 
specifications that relate inflation to the output gap.6  
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In addition, the present study differs from previous work by explicitly deriving 
expressions for the paths followed by wages and unemployment in response to shocks. 
Deriving these expressions makes it possible to demonstrate that wage curve and Phillips 
curve relationships are obtained in a model in which wages and unemployment are both 
endogenous, and it enables wage and unemployment dynamics to be simulated in a 




In deriving the model, the following assumptions are made: 
 
1. Workers’ efficiency (e) depends on the ratio of their current wage to their expectations 
of wages at other firms and on the unemployment rate, so that 
 
,0  and,0,0,0with],,/[ <<>>Ω= WuWWuWttt eeeeuWee
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where Wt is a worker’s current wage, Ωt denotes workers’ expectations of average 
wages (to be defined below), and ut is the unemployment rate. Explanations for why 
productivity may depend on wages and unemployment include the shirking model of 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984); the gift-exchange/fair wage models of Akerlof (1982, 1984) 
and Akerlof and Yellen (1990); the labor turnover models of Stiglitz (1974), Schlicht 
(1978), and Salop (1979); and the adverse selection model of Weiss (1980). The 
function ],/[ ttt uWe Ω  can be viewed as incorporating all of these explanations. 
 
2. When a regional economy is modeled, workers’ efficiency depends both on regional 
and aggregate labor market conditions, since both regional and aggregate conditions 
may affect the cost of job loss, the satisfaction workers feel towards their employer, and 
the quit propensity of workers. Thus, efficiency depends both on the ratio between a 
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worker’s wage and a weighted average of regional and aggregate wages, and on a 
weighted average of the regional and aggregate unemployment rates. In particular, it is 
assumed that 
 
  ( ) ( ) 11 1 νν −ΩΩ=Ω NtRtt ,                       and 
  Nt
R
tt uuu )1( 22 νν −+= ,
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where RtΩ  and 
N
tΩ  represent workers’ expectations of average regional and national 
wages, ν1 is the weight they place on regional wages (relative to aggregate wages) in 
comparing their own wages to a benchmark, Rtu  and 
N
tu  are the regional and national 
unemployment rates, and ν2 is the weight workers place on regional unemployment in 
making decisions that affect their efficiency.  
The assumption that efficiency depends on labor market conditions both inside and 
outside of the regional economy is supported by previous research. Ziliak et al. (1999), 
Jimeno and Bentolila (1998), Buettner (1999), and Elhorst et al. (2005) find that 
workers’ wages depend on wages and/or unemployment in both the regional and 
national economies.9 In addition, Morrison et al. (2006) show that quits (which may 
negatively affect efficiency) in local labor markets in New Zealand respond to wages in 
other regions of the country. Furthermore, U.S. Census Bureau data indicate that 
workers are mobile across regions, and Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Kennan and 
Walker (2003) find that migration depends on relative labor market conditions.10 The 
evidence that workers are geographically mobile and that migration depends on relative 
economic conditions suggests that workers’ behavior is affected by both regional and 
aggregate conditions.  
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3. In the short run, workers may have incomplete information on current wages at other 
firms and may use information on lagged average wages to help predict current average 
wages.11 The fact that expectations of current average wages depend partly on lagged 
average wages means that workers’ expectations of average wages can be viewed as a 
mixture of rational and adaptive expectations, so that 
 
( ) ( ) ωω −−=Ω 11RtRtRt WW    and    ( ) ( ) ωω −−=Ω 11NtNtNt WW , 
 
 
where RW  represents average wages in the workers’ region, NW represents average 
wages in the aggregate economy, and ω measures the degree to which expectations are 
unbiased.12  
While much work in macroeconomics assumes that expectations are rational (i.e., 
unbiased), empirical evidence and theoretical considerations suggest that expectations 
may be better described as a mixture of rational and adaptive expectations. Economists 
who have examined survey forecasts of inflation generally find that inflationary 
expectations do not satisfy the criteria for completely rational expectations.13 From a 
theoretical standpoint, Conlisk (1988) argues that if it is costly to form accurate 
expectations of next period’s price level, then optimal forecasts may be a weighted 
average of an unbiased estimate obtained from agents’ costly optimization activities and 
a “free estimator,” which may be determined from an adaptive expectations process. In 
addition, the assumption that expectations are not completely rational is made in the 
Phillips curve models of Blanchard and Katz (1999) and Mankiw and Reis (2002).14  




γθ −= PQ * ,  
 
where *θ  is the level of product demand, and γ is the price elasticity of demand. 
Accordingly, P can be expressed as 
  γγ θθθ
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5. Firms produce output with the Cobb-Douglas production function, 
   
[ ]φφφ tttt uWeKLAQ ,/ tt10 Ω= − , 
 
 
where technology (A) is exogenous and capital is fixed at K0. 
 
 
6. Labor supply in each region is inelastic and equals N times the number of firms. 
Parameters are chosen so that there is excess supply of labor in each region. It should be 
noted that assuming a positive relationship between wages and efficiency does not 
guarantee that there will be excess supply of labor. Suppose each firm faces an upward-
sloping labor supply curve, in which labor supply equals N when its wage equals the 
regional average. A firm operates to the left of its labor supply curve (i.e., pays an 
efficiency wage) if the elasticity of output with respect to the wage, calculated at the 
market-clearing wage, exceeds the elasticity of output with respect to employment. 
Otherwise, it operates on its labor supply curve. Parameters are chosen so that firms 
maximize profits by paying efficiency wages, so wages (W) and employment (L) are 
determined by differentiating the profit function with respect to both W and L.    
 
 Given these assumptions, profits in each period are 
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φφφθ . (1) 
  
 
4. A model of wage behavior at the local level 
 
This section develops a model of wage setting in a regional labor market under the 
assumption that workers’ efficiency depends on both local and aggregate labor market 
conditions (i.e., 0<ν1<1 and 0<ν2<1). This model is used to determine the effect of regional 
unemployment and lagged regional wages on current regional wages, to determine the paths 
followed by wages and unemployment in response to demand shocks, and to derive an 
expression for the long-run wage curve elasticity. In Section 5, numerical values are chosen 
for the model’s parameters, allowing wage curve coefficients to be calculated.  
The profits of a representative firm are given by equation (1). Differentiating this 
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If (2) is substituted into (3), the following condition, which is analogous to the Solow 
(1979) condition, is obtained:  
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tttWtttt uWeuWeW .  (4) 
  
Totally differentiating equation (4), dividing it by the original equation, and 
substituting 1)/( −=Ω Wtt eeW  (from equation 4) yields  
  





















−+Ω−= −  (5) 
 
where ttt WdWW /ˆ =  and ttt d ΩΩ=Ω /ˆ . Equation (5) is a relationship between percentage 
deviations in Wt, percentage deviations in Ωt, and absolute deviations in ut from their initial 
equilibrium values. (In this study, variables with “^”’s over them represent percentage 
deviations from steady-state values.) By making the substitutions Nt
R
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If the first term on the right-hand side is multiplied and divided by Rtu , and if 
R
tuˆ  is defined 
as Rt
R

































































 In equations (6a) and (6b), the coefficient on regional unemployment is negative. In 
addition, the coefficient on lagged regional wages is between 0 and 1, which means that a 
regional economy is characterized by a wage curve rather than by a Phillips curve.  
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 Equation (6a) is a relationship between the percentage deviation in wages and 
the absolute deviation in unemployment from their initial equilibrium values, while (6b) is a 
relationship between the percentage deviation in wages and the percentage deviation in 
unemployment.  Thus, the first equation is equivalent to a regression of the log of wages on 
the level of unemployment, while the second is equivalent to a regression of the log of 
wages on the log of unemployment, as wage curves are generally estimated. 
 Whether equation (6a) or (6b) provides a better model for empirical estimation 
depends on whether the coefficient on Rtdu (in 6a) or the coefficient on 
R
tuˆ  (in 6b) is less 
affected by changes in the local unemployment rate. It is quite plausible that the coefficient 
on Rtuˆ  is less affected by changes in 
Ru , even though Ru  appears in the numerator of it. A 
rise in Ru  may reduce 1ν  and 2ν , since individuals living in areas with high unemployment 
may become more willing to move to another labor market, and may therefore become 
more concerned with aggregate labor market conditions (relative to local conditions). If the 
effect of unemployment on 1ν  and 2ν  is large enough, then changes in local unemployment 
may have less effect on the coefficient on Rtuˆ  than on the coefficient on 
R
tdu . Evidence for 
an inverse relationship between Ru  and ν2 is found in Longhi et al. (2006), as their results 
indicate that local wages in Germany respond more to unemployment in nearby regions as 
local unemployment increases. Thus, this analysis provides a possible explanation for why 
researchers have found that a log-log specification fits the data better than a log-level 
specification. This issue is explored further in Section 7.16 
 The model developed in this section can be used to determine the paths followed by 
regional wages and unemployment in response to demand shocks. There are three reasons 
for calculating the response of these variables to demand shocks. First, equations (6a) and 
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(6b) implicitly treat current regional wages as the dependent variable and regional 
unemployment and lagged regional wages as independent variables. Determining paths for 
wages and unemployment and using these expressions as data in a regression verifies that 
the same coefficients are obtained in a model in which these three variables are 
endogenously determined from their response to exogenous demand shocks. Second, 
determining paths for wages and unemployment allows us to examine the long-run 
responses of these variables to shocks. Third, the equations for wages and unemployment 
derived in this section are used in simulations of a multiregional economy in Section 7.  






= .  (7) 
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Appendix A derives expressions for wages and unemployment as functions of the 






































































































































η  (10) 
 
We now consider the effects of two types of regional demand shocks on the 
behavior of wages and unemployment over time (with technology, wages in other labor 
markets, and unemployment in other labor markets held constant). The first type of demand 
shock is a series of stochastic shocks starting in period 1. It is assumed that 0ˆ =tθ  for 
0≤t , and that ttt εθθ += −1  for 1≥t , where tε  is a random error with a mean of 0. 
Appendix B demonstrates that the paths of wages and unemployment in response to a series 
























































The second type of shock is a one-time permanent shock to demand at time t=1, 
such that 0ˆ =tθ  for 0≤t  and St =θˆ  for 1≥t . This is a special case of stochastic demand 
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These expressions for wages and unemployment from periods 1 through T are 




tt WduW εββ ++= −121 ˆˆˆˆ . (13) 
 
  
Since tWˆ  and 1ˆ −tW  represent percentage deviations from steady state values and 
R
tdu  
represents absolute deviations, equation (13) is equivalent to a regression in levels of the 
form tt
R
tt WuW εββα +++= − )ln(ˆˆ)ln( 121 .
17 With both types of demand shocks, Appendix 
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 When the regression equation is tt
R
tt WuW εββ ++= −
∗
121
ˆˆˆˆˆ , 2βˆ  is the same as before, 

























 The coefficient on lagged regional wages and the coefficients on regional 
unemployment (expressed either as absolute deviations or percentage deviations) are the 
same as in equations (6a) and (6b). Thus, identical coefficients are obtained if current 
wages are treated as endogenous and unemployment and lagged wages are treated as 
exogenous or if all three variables are viewed as being endogenously determined by the 
economy’s transition path following a demand shock.   
These coefficients are obtained from a model that considers only a single regional 
economy, whereas wage curves are generally estimated with pooled data from multiple 
regions of a country. However, Section 7 demonstrates that the same coefficients are 
obtained in a multiregional economy.  
 In the long-run (i.e., as t→∞), a permanent demand shock raises wages by 
)]1(1/[ 1να −+S and lowers unemployment by Sz1 . Thus, there is a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between these variables, or a wage curve. The long-run elasticity of wages with 
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The analysis in this section does not explicitly consider technology shocks. 
However, equations (9) and (10) show that technology shocks and demand shocks have 
proportional effects on wages and unemployment, since the coefficient on technology is 
γγ /)1( −  times the coefficient on demand in both equations. Thus, modeling a technology 
shock would yield the same regression coefficients that were derived in this section.  
In addition, the model assumes that wages are set unilaterally by firms. If it is 
instead assumed that wages are determined from bargaining between firms and their 
employees, the equilibrium wage would depend on the assumptions of the bargaining 
model. Suppose that the wage negotiated between firms and workers is chosen to maximize 
the function, λλ −Π= 1UV , where U is the workers’ objective function, Π is the firm’s 
profits, and λ represents the union’s relative bargaining strength. If the workers’ objective 
function is UNLWUuWU −=−−= )/()1(  (where W(1-u) is total income and U  is the 
reservation utility level), then it can be demonstrated that maximizing V yields equation (4). 
Thus, if efficiency depends on wages and unemployment and if workers seek to maximize 
total income, a bargaining model and an efficiency wage model yield the same solution for 
the wage and for the relationship between wages and unemployment. The reason why both 
models yield the same solution is that labor income and profits are constant proportions of 
total revenue in the model developed here, so firms and workers both have the incentive to 
choose the wage that maximizes total revenue.19  
It could also be assumed that workers bargain over the wage instead of total income, 
so that their objective function is UWU −= . If reservation utility is a constant fraction of 
the average wage, it can be demonstrated that the solution looks like equation (4), except 
that the right-hand side is a constant that is less than 1. In this case, linearizing the model 
around its steady state still yields a wage curve, although the coefficient on unemployment 
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is lower than in the efficiency wage case. However, under reasonable conditions, the 
coefficient may be similar to the coefficient in a pure efficiency wage model.20  
 
5. Numerical wage curve estimates 
 
 If numerical values are assigned to the model’s parameters, the magnitudes of the 
long-run wage curve elasticity (equation 15), the short-run wage curve elasticity (equation 
14c), and the coefficient on lagged wages (equation 14b) can be determined. Baseline 
values for these parameters are chosen, and the short- and long-run wage curve elasticities 
and the coefficient on lagged wages are calculated. Then the robustness of the results is 
examined by varying parameters from their baseline values.  
 For the baseline parameters, 1ν  (the weight workers place on local wages in 
comparing their own wages to a benchmark), 2ν  (the weight they place on local unemploy-
ment), and ω (the degree to which expectations are unbiased) are assumed to equal 0.5. In 
addition, Ru (the regional unemployment rate) and e (average efficiency) are set at 0.06 and 
0.8, respectively. It is assumed that We  equals e, since (from equation 4) ttW Wee /
1 Ω=− , 
and the ratio between tΩ  and tW  should, on average, equal 1. A value for ue  is chosen so 
that the elasticity of efficiency with respect to the unemployment rate equals 0.05, based on 
Wadhwani and Wall’s (1991) and Weisskopf’s (1987) estimates of the effect of 
unemployment on productivity.21  
There is little empirical evidence concerning the magnitudes of WWe  and Wue . To 
obtain values for these parameters, specific assumptions are made about the form of the 
efficiency function. Two specifications for the efficiency function are considered. The first 













t uaWaae 321ln ,                     with a2>0 and a3>0. 
 
The second specification (referred to as the micro-based efficiency function) is derived in 
Campbell (2006), which develops a model in which a worker’s choice of effort is 
determined in a utility-maximizing framework, based on the shirking and fair wage 
versions of efficiency wage theory. Both efficiency specifications have three free 
parameters, and the assumptions concerning e, We , and ue  determine these parameters, 
allowing values for WWe  and Wue  to be calculated.
22   
An advantage of the second specification is that it is derived in a rigorous 
framework from utility-maximizing behavior. On the other hand, the first specification is 
more general, whereas the second specification comes from a model that is based on two 
versions of efficiency wage theory and that ignores other reasons why productivity may 
depend on wages (e.g., turnover and adverse selection). Using two specifications that are 
obtained in very different ways provides a check on the robustness of the results. 
Table 1 reports ∗1βˆ  (the coefficient on unemployment in the log-log specification), 
2βˆ  (the coefficient on lagged wages), and the long-run wage curve elasticity. In the 
baseline specification, the long-run elasticity is -0.1125 with the naïve efficiency function 
and -0.0748 with the micro-based efficiency function. Empirical values for this elasticity 
have been estimated with data from many countries by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) 
and others. The vast majority of studies report long-run elasticities between -0.03 and -0.20. 
Nijkamp and Poot (2005) conduct a meta-analysis on a sample of 208 wage curve 
elasticities and find that the mean elasticity is about -0.12. However, when they control for 
publication bias, they estimate that the average wage curve elasticity is about -0.07. Thus, 
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with both efficiency functions, the elasticities calculated with the baseline parameters are 
well within the range of values that have been estimated empirically.  
Table 1 also reports the results when parameters are above and below their baseline 
values, and all but one long-run elasticity lies between -0.03 and -0.20. This table shows 
that changes in parameters other than 1ν  and 2ν  have relatively small effects on the wage 
curve elasticity. The fact that the wage curve elasticity is relatively invariant to changes in 
most of the parameters and to different specifications of the efficiency function may explain 
why researchers have found similar elasticities for many countries.   
The two parameters that have a large effect on the wage curve elasticity are ν1 and 
ν2. As the ν’s increase, the predicted wage curve elasticity rises substantially, consistent 
with the results of Longhi et al. (2006), who find higher wage curve elasticities in labor 
markets that are more isolated (i.e., ones with lower degrees of agglomeration/ 
accessibility). It is likely that 1ν  and 2ν  are higher in these areas, since workers in these 
regions should be less influenced by external wages and unemployment.  
Table 1 also reports the coefficient on lagged wages ( 2βˆ ). None of these values is 
close to 1, in agreement with the wage curve literature. However, most of the predicted 
coefficients are smaller than typical empirical estimates. For example, Montuenga-Gómez 
and Ramos-Parreño (2005) report a total of 21 coefficients on lagged wages obtained from 
16 wage curve studies. The average value of these coefficients is 0.44, and the interquartile 
range is 0.28 to 0.65. While most of the predicted coefficients in Table 1 are below the 
average value, the coefficients are close to 0.44 in the second row, in which expectations 
are assumed to be mostly adaptive (i.e., ω=0.25), and in the last row, in which ν1=0.6 and 
ν2=0.4. These values of ν1 and ν2 imply that workers place a slightly higher weight on 
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regional wages than on national wages but place a slightly higher weight on national 
unemployment than on regional unemployment. It seems plausible that ν1>0.5 and ν2<0.5, 
since workers may have greater knowledge of wages in their region than of wages in the 
rest of the economy, but may have greater knowledge of national unemployment than of 
local unemployment, because national figures are highly publicized.  
 
6. A model of the aggregate economy 
 
 This section examines the behavior of aggregate wages and unemployment. At 
the aggregate level, both ν1 and ν2 equal 1, and ΩR and uR can be replaced with Ω and u. 
When the aggregate economy experiences a one-time permanent demand shock, the paths 
of wages and unemployment are 
 











γφαγωLsz 23  (16b) 
 
This demand shock eventually raises wages by the same percentage amount, since 
SWt =ˆ  as t approaches infinity. However, wages adjust gradually to their new equilibrium, 
so unemployment initially rises or falls from its original level. Over time, unemployment 
returns to its original level, implying that the economy has a natural rate of unemployment. 
(The economy also returns to its natural rate after a technology shock.) At the aggregate 
level, there is no equilibrium relationship between wages and unemployment since demand 
shocks have permanent effects on wages but have no long-run effects on unemployment. 




















       and        (17a) 
 1ˆ2 =β . (17b) 
 
Since 1ˆ2 =β , the unemployment rate is related to the rate of change in wages, so the 
aggregate economy is characterized by a Phillips curve.24 In this Phillips curve relationship, 
unemployment and wages are endogenously determined by the profit-maximizing behavior 
of firms during the economy’s transition between its initial equilibrium and its new 
equilibrium. The Phillips curve is a disequilibrium relationship, since it is determined from 
wages and unemployment in the transition between equilibia.  
 The slope of the Phillips Curve is given by equation (17a). In the limiting case in 
which ω =1 (i.e., expectations are unbiased), the Phillips curve is vertical, as predicted by 
proponents of new classical macroeconomics. With the baseline parameters from Section 5, 
1βˆ  equals -3.75 with the naïve efficiency function and -2.49 with the micro-based 
efficiency function. However, when Phillips curves are estimated with annual data, the 
estimated coefficients tend to be smaller than these the predicted values. (It is more 
reasonable to compare the predicted coefficients with estimates from annual regressions 
than from quarterly regressions, since the model assumes that wages are set each period and 
most people’s wages are set each year.) For example, with annual data, Blanchard and Katz 
(1997) estimate coefficients on the unemployment rate that lie between -0.95 and -1.02.  
While the predicted values of 1βˆ  are higher than values that have been estimated 
empirically, there are two ways in which the present model can be reconciled with these 
empirical results. First, a lower value of ω would result in a lower predicted coefficient. 
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Second, in the model developed in this study, imperfect information is the only reason for 
the slow adjustment of wages in response to shocks. In reality, however, there may be other 
impediments to wage adjustment. One possibility is that workers’ effort may depend on 
wage changes as well as on wage levels. Evidence that effort depends on wage changes is 
discussed in Kahneman et al. (1986), Campbell and Kamlani (1997), Bewley (1994), and 
Clark (1999).25 Also, Akerlof (2007) considers workers’ concerns about wage norms 
(which may depend on past wages) to be one of the “missing motivations” in 
macroeconomics.   
Modified versions of the model were derived in which efficiency depends on wage 
changes as well as on wage levels (with the elasticity of efficiency with respect to wage 
changes set equal to 1). In one version efficiency depends on absolute wage changes and in 
the other it depends on relative wage changes. When ω is assumed to equal 0.25 (instead of 
0.5), the value of 1βˆ  in the modified model lies between -0.713 and -1.22, a range 
consistent with empirical estimates.26    
 
7. Simulations with a multiregional economy 
Section 4 derives regression coefficients for the relationship between wages and 
unemployment in a single region, in isolation from other regional economies. In Section 6 
regression coefficients are derived for the aggregate economy, treating the aggregate 
economy as a single entity rather than as the average of regional economies. This section 
demonstrates that similar results are obtained in an economy consisting of different regions, 
in which efficiency depends on both regional and national labor market conditions. The 
behavior of an economy consisting of 10 regions is simulated over 20 time periods, under 
the assumption that there are stochastic aggregate and regional specific demand shocks in 
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each period.27 The parameters are the same as the baseline parameters (with the micro-
based efficiency function) in Section 5, and a total of 50 simulations were performed. 
With each simulation, regional wages and unemployment in each time period are 
treated as data in a pooled cross-section time-series regression. Regressions are run both 
with and without lagged regional wages, and two specifications for the unemployment rate 
are considered. The first specification is ∗udu Rt /  (where u* is the natural rate of 
unemployment), which is analogous to log-level estimation since it treats a given change in 
unemployment as having the same effect on tWˆ  at any unemployment rate. The second 
specification for unemployment is ]ln[ Rtduu +
∗ . With this specification, a given change in 
unemployment has a larger effect on tWˆ  as unemployment falls, and it is analogous to log-
log estimation. In addition, these regressions also include time dummy variables.  
Table 2a reports the results of these regressions. For each variable, the top row is the 
average value across all 50 simulations, and the bottom row (in parentheses) gives the 
lowest and highest values. Several results are worth noting. First, in column 1 (which 
includes lagged wages and the first specification for unemployment), the coefficients on 
unemployment and lagged wages are always the same as the baseline values in Table 1, in 
which a single labor market is considered in isolation. These results suggest that 
considering a single region by itself does not give misleading results.  
Second, the R2’s are always higher with the log-level specification than with the log-
log specification. However, as previously discussed, a log-log specification may provide a 
better fit if the ν’s depend negatively on the difference between regional and aggregate 
unemployment. If the ν’s are functions of uR-uN, the relationship between regional wages 
and unemployment will be nonlinear, and a log-log specification may approximately 
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capture this nonlinearity. In addition, the coefficient on lagged wages may be different than 
the value predicted by (6a) and (6b) if the ν’s are functions of uR-uN. 
To examine the implications of the ν’s depending on unemployment differentials, 




tititi dudu −−==νν , where 
ti,,1ν  and ti,,2ν  are the values of ν1 and ν2 in region i at time t.
28 Table 2b reports wage 
equations estimated with these simulated data. In this table a log-log specification 
outperforms a log-level specification, providing a potential explanation for why a log-log 
specification generally fits the data better than a log-level specification in estimating wage 
curves. In addition, with the log-log specification the average coefficient on lagged wages 
is closer to 0.333 (the value predicted by (6a) and (6b)) than with the log-level 
specification, and it is only 5% different from the predicted value. 29  
The regional data are then averaged to form aggregate time-series data. With these 
data, wages are regressed on unemployment and lagged wages, and the results are reported 
in Table 2c. The coefficients on the unemployment rate and lagged wages are identical to 
those calculated in Section 6. Thus, the same coefficients are obtained if we view the 
aggregate economy as a single entity or as an average of regional economies.   
These simulations show that regional data on wages and unemployment produce a 
wage curve when pooled wage equations are estimated and yield a Phillips curve when 
regional data are averaged to form aggregate data. Thus, these simulations can explain why 
different conclusions about the relationship between wages and unemployment have been 
reached by researchers who have estimated wage equations with individual or regional data 
and those who have estimated wage equations with aggregate data.  
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These simulations assume that labor supply in each region is fixed. However, as 
discussed in Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), workers can migrate between regions in 
response to differences in labor market conditions. To examine the effect of migration in 
the model, simulations were run in which migration into a region depends positively on the 
difference between regional and national wages and negatively on the difference between 
regional and national unemployment. The coefficients in the migration equation were 
determined from the migration equation estimated by Layard et al. (1991, p. 316) for the 
U.S., and 50 simulations were performed.  
Regressions of the same form as those in Table 2a were estimated with the 
simulated data, and the results are reported in Table 2d. The coefficients in Tables 2a and 
2d are identical in the first column and are not very different in the other three columns. 
Thus, similar wage curves are obtained from simulations assuming fixed regional labor 
supply and simulations incorporating migration. One difference, though, is that allowing 
migration greatly reduces the variance of unemployment across regions and time. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 This study develops an efficiency wage model that predicts the coefficients on 
unemployment and lagged wages in a wage equation and that predicts the paths followed by 
wages and unemployment in response to demand shocks. The wage equation looks like a 
wage curve when regional economies are modeled and looks like a Phillips curve at the 
national level.  
 The model predicts different behavior at the regional and aggregate levels because 
of the assumptions about the determinants of workers’ efficiency. In modeling a regional 
economy, it is assumed that efficiency depends on both regional and national economic 
conditions. As a result, the coefficient on lagged wages is less than 1, and there is an 
 26 
equilibrium relationship between regional wages and unemployment. However, in 
modeling the aggregate economy, there is no distinction between the regional and national 
economies, which results in lagged wages having a coefficient of 1 and the economy 
returning to a natural rate of unemployment. Because unemployment eventually returns to 
its natural rate, there is no long-term relationship between wages and unemployment. Thus, 
the Phillips curve is a disequilibrium relationship that is determined from the paths of 
wages and unemployment in the transition between equilibria.  
When reasonable parameter values are chosen, the calculated wage curve elasticities 
are generally close to empirically estimated values. In addition, if expectations are assumed 
to be mostly adaptive and if the model is modified to allow efficiency to depend on both 
wage levels and wage changes, the predicted slope of the Phillips curve is close to values 
that have been estimated empirically. 
This study also considers simulations of a multiregional economy in which there are 
aggregate and region-specific demand shocks in each period. Data on regional wages and 
unemployment yield a wage curve when pooled regressions are estimated, and the 
coefficients in this wage curve are the same as the coefficients obtained when a single 
regional economy is considered in isolation. When the regional data are averaged to form 
aggregate data, the relationship between wages and unemployment at the national level is a 
Phillips curve. Thus, it is demonstrated that there is no contradiction between studies that 
find evidence for a wage curve with regional data and those finding evidence for a Phillips 
curve with aggregate data. 
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Appendix A 
When equation (2) is totally differentiated and divided by the original equation, the solution 
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Defining α as  
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This appendix derives expressions for wages and unemployment over time in 
response to a series of stochastic demand shocks (with technology, wages in other labor 
markets, and unemployment in other labor markets held constant). Suppose that 0ˆ =tθ  for 
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It can be shown that z1 and z2 are both negative. The first term in α is unambiguously 
positive, since 0<WWe , 0<Wue , 0>ue , and 0<η . Thus, 
 .)1(
γ
γφα −−>  
The fact that 1]/)1([ −>−−> γγφα  means that 0)]1([ >−+ γφαγ , 0)]1(1[ 1 >−+ ωνα , 




The values of 1βˆ  and 2βˆ  can be calculated by using the relationship 
yXX)X(β 1 ′′= −ˆ  , where y is a vector of wages from period 1 through period T and X is a 
matrix whose first column is the unemployment rate from periods 1 through T and whose 
second column is wages from periods 0 through T -1. Using this equation, the values of 1βˆ  
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However, the derivation of 1βˆ  and 2βˆ  from the equation yXX)X(β
1 ′′= −ˆ  is quite tedious 
and is not reported here, since there is a simpler way of showing that these are the correct 
values of the coefficients. For both a one-time permanent demand shock and a series of 
stochastic demand shocks, the regression equations have a perfect fit.30 Since the equation 
yXX)X(β 1 ′′= −ˆ  is derived by minimizing )ˆ()ˆ( βXyβXy −′− ,  the values of 1βˆ  and 2βˆ  in 





tt WduW ββ  for all values of t). For a series of stochastic demand shocks,   
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t Wdu ββ  tWˆ= . 
 
 
A one-time permanent demand shock is a special case (with S=1ε  and 0=tε  for 
t≥2) of the above derivation, so the predicted coefficients would be the same.   
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1 The issue of whether the coefficient on lagged wages is less than one or equal to one is controversial. 
Blanchard and Katz (1997) estimate wage equations at the state level with several U.S. data sets, and they find 
a coefficient on lagged wages that is close to 1. In addition, Card and Hyslop’s (1997) regressions with U.S. 
state data provide support for a Phillips curve relationship over a wage curve relationship. On the other hand, 
many studies (e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), Barth et al. (2002), and Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2005)) find coefficients on lagged wages that are significantly less than 1. As discussed in Section 5, 
Montuenga-Gómez and Ramos-Parreño (2005) report estimated coefficients on lagged wages obtained from 
16 separate wage curve studies, and a total of 21 estimated coefficients are reported. The average of the 
reported coefficients is 0.44, and only three of the 21 coefficients are greater than 0.75. Thus, most of the 
empirical evidence suggests that the coefficient on lagged wages is significantly less than 1.  
2 Several studies use panel data to estimate wage curves. Bratsberg and Turunen (1996) and Turunen 
(1998) estimate wage curves for the United States with data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 
and Montuenga et al. (2003) use the European Community Household Panel data to estimate wage curves for 
five European countries.  
3 Technology shocks are not explicitly analyzed. However, as discussed in Section 4, the model 
developed in this study predicts that technology shocks and demand shocks will have proportionate effects on 
wages and unemployment, so the coefficients in a wage equation would be the same for both types of shocks. 
4 Two studies that consider both the wage curve and the Phillips curve are Roberts (1997b) and Whelan 
(2000). Roberts develops a staggered-contract model of wage setting for individual workers in which a 
worker’s wage depends on the national price level, expectations of next period’s national price level, and the 
log of the regional (or industry) unemployment rate. Under the assumption that prices are a constant markup 
over labor costs, he demonstrates that there is a Phillips curve (for price inflation) at the national level. In 
Whelan (2000), it is demonstrated that a Phillips curve at the aggregate level is consistent with any degree of 
wage autocorrelation at the microeconomic level. However, this study does not explain the factors that 
determine the degree of autocorrelation (ρ) and does not provide an explanation for why ρ would be less than 
1 at the regional level. 
5 It should be noted that a pure Phillips curve relationship is not found in every country. As discussed in 
Montuenga-Gómez and Ramos-Parreño (2005, p. 757), evidence suggests that the United States is 
characterized by a pure Phillips curve, while most European countries are “characterized by a modified 
version of the Phillips curve with error correction but high autocorrelation.” 
6 One difference between the present study and Galí and Gertler (1999) is that the present study assumes 
partly backward-looking expectations, while expectations in Galí and Gertler are mostly forward looking. 
However, Galí and Gertler consider the expectations of firms and the present study considers the expectations 
of workers, and it is likely that firms’ expectations are more sophisticated than workers’ expectations.       
7 The rationale for assuming that 0<Wue is that dWde /  is likely to fall as u rises. For example, when the 
unemployment rate is 6%, a firm that increases wages by 10% is likely to experience a significant fall in quits 
and a significant rise in effort. On the other hand, at an unemployment rate of 15%, quits are probably already 
low and effort is probably already high, so a firm raising wages by 10% would probably not see large 
additional changes in quits and effort. Thus, dWde / is probably smaller at a 15% unemployment rate than at 
a 6% unemployment rate. In addition, Campbell (2006) develops a model of workers’ effort from utility-
maximizing behavior and demonstrates that, given the model’s assumptions, Wue  is unambiguously negative.  
8 The reason for using geometric weights in the specification for Ω  and arithmetic weights in the 
specification for u is that Ω  is later expressed in terms of percentage deviations from its initial equilibrium 
value, while u is expressed in terms of absolute deviations from its initial equilibrium value. While it is 
probably more natural to use arithmetic weights rather than geometric weights, using arithmetic weights for Ω 
would not greatly affect the results of the study. First, if RtΩ  and 
N
tΩ  are not too different, the arithmetic and 
geometric means are almost the same. Second, expressing Ω as a percentage deviation from its initial level 
yields Nt
R




tt ss Ω−+Ω=Ω ΩΩ )1(ˆ 11 νν  with 
arithmetic weights (where sΩ equals the steady-state value of ])1(/[ 11
NRR Ω−+ΩΩ νν ).  Since sΩ is likely to 
be close to 1, the only difference between arithmetic and geometric weights would be slightly different 




                                                                                                                                                     
9 Ziliak et al. (1999) regress individual real wages on the aggregate and county unemployment rates (with 
data from the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics), and their results indicate that aggregate unemployment 
and county unemployment both have significant effects, with the effect of aggregate unemployment occurring 
contemporaneously and the effect of county unemployment occurring with a lag. Jimeno and Bentolila (1998) 
find that wages within sectors and regions in Spain are affected by both regional and national variables (i.e., 
wages and unemployment). In Buettner (1999), regional wages in Germany are found to depend on lagged 
wages and unemployment in neighboring areas. The results of Elhorst et al. (2005) indicate that wages in 
eastern Germany are affected both by regional and national unemployment. 
10 According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2000), over the five year periods 1975-1980, 1980-1985, 1985-
1990, and 1990-1995, 20.1% of the population moved to a different state, and 20.9% moved to a different 
county within the same state. Interstate migration is shown by Blanchard and Katz (1992) to depend on 
differences in state unemployment rates and by Kennan and Walker (2003) to depend on expected income 
differences. In fact, Blanchard and Katz (1999, p. 72) state that, “labor mobility is a major source of 
adjustment to state labor market shocks” in the United States.   
11 This assumption means that wages must vary across firms, so that workers cannot infer the average 
wage from their own wage. For example, it could be assumed that firms make random errors in setting wages, 
but that the profit-maximizing wage is set on average. These errors may result from firms’ lacking perfect 
information about the level of product demand or about the parameters in their profit functions. 
12 For simplicity it is assumed that ω is the same in forming expectations of both regional and national 
wages. In reality, however, it is possible that ω will be different in the expressions for RtΩ  and 
N
tΩ . 
Simulations (similar to the ones in Section 7) indicate that when ω is allowed to differ in the equations for 
R
tΩ  and 
N
tΩ , the wage curve coefficients depend only on the value of regional ω . In addition, it should be 
noted that Ω could be assumed to depend on the past growth in wages. The reason why the present study uses 
a specification in which Ω depends on the past level of wages is to obtain a clearer comparison between the 
wage curve and the Phillips curve. 
13 Gramlich (1983), de Leeuw and McKelvey (1984), and Baghestani (1992) show that survey measures 
of expected inflation are not unbiased predictors of actual inflation. Batchelor and Dua (1989), Roberts 
(1997a, 1998), Thomas (1999), and Mankiw et al. (2003) find that errors in survey inflation forecasts are not 
orthogonal to information available at the time of the forecast. In addition, Roberts (1998) shows that survey 
forecasts of inflation can be explained by a model in which part of the population has rational expectations 
and the rest has adaptive expectations.  
14 Blanchard and Katz (1999) derive a Phillips curve from a model in which workers’ reservation wages 
depend on lagged aggregate wages. In Mankiw and Reis (2002) it is demonstrated that a “sticky information” 
model (in which each period a fraction of firms receives information that enables them to compute optimal 
prices, while other firms set prices based on out-of-date information) is able to explain output and inflation 
dynamics better than a sticky price model. Empirical support for the hypothesis that Phillips curves depend 
partly on lagged inflation comes from Fuhrer (1997), who finds that the hypothesis that expectations are 
completely rational can be rejected in Phillips curve specifications in which expected inflation depends on a 
weighted average of lagged inflation and actual future inflation. 










t WW . Since the average regional wage 
equals the wage of a representative firm in the region, t
R
t WW = .  
16 For a log-log specification to provide a better fit than a log-level specification, it is necessary that local 
unemployment have a smaller effect on the coefficient on Rtuˆ  than on the coefficient on 
R
tdu , but it is not 
necessary that the coefficient on Rtuˆ  be completely unaffected by changes in unemployment. The coefficient 
on Rtuˆ  would be completely unaffected by unemployment if changes in u
R and the ν’s exactly offset each 
other, implying an exact log-log relationship. However, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) do not state that the 
relationship between wages and unemployment is exactly log-log. Rather, they find a nonlinear relationship 
between unemployment and the log of wages, and they use a log-log specification (which they demonstrate 
fits the data better than a log-level specification) to account for this nonlinearity. In fact, estimated wage 
equations in Layard et al. (1991) suggest that the relationship is not exactly log-log. When they include both 
the level and the log of the unemployment rate in the wage equation, the log and the level of unemployment 
are both significant, although the log has a quantitatively larger effect.  
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17 Let W* and u* represent the steady-state values of the wage and unemployment rate. Then 
)ˆ1( ttt WWdWWW +≈+=
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∗ .  Thus, )ln(ˆˆ)ln( 121 −++= t
R















tt WduWuWW ββββα . Since )ln(ˆˆ)ln(
*
21
* WuW ββα −−= ∗ , the term in 
square brackets equals 0.  
18 The same value for the long-run elasticity is obtained when the long-run wage is divided by the long-
run unemployment rate (where both are expressed in terms of percentage deviations.) This long-run elasticity 
becomes infinite when ν1=1, because a demand shock has no long-run effect on unemployment (i.e., the 
economy is characterized by a natural rate of unemployment), but causes a permanent change in wages. 
19 A simple way to demonstrate that the bargaining and efficiency wage solutions are identical is to 
substitute (2) into the equation UNWLU −= /)( and set dU/dW=0. This maximization problem yields 
equation (4), which means that firms and workers have the incentive to set the same wage.  
20 For example, suppose that the coefficient on the right-hand side of equation (4) equals 0.5 instead of 1. 
With the micro-based efficiency function (discussed in Section 5), the coefficient on the unemployment rate in 
a bargaining model in which UWU −=  is only 10% lower than the coefficient obtained in a model in which 
wages are unilaterally set by firms. 
While the presence of collective bargaining may not, in itself, have a large effect on the wage curve 
elasticity, the degree to which regional versus national variables are the target of wage negotiations may affect 
the value of ν1, which is a determinant of the wage curve elasticity. (This point was suggested by an 
anonymous referee.) 
21 Wadhwani and Wall (1991) find an elasticity of productivity with respect to the unemployment rate 
equal to 0.05 for British manufacturing firms, and Weisskopf (1987) finds that a one percentage point rise in 
unemployment (e.g., from 5% to 6%) raises labor productivity by approximately 0.01% in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. 
22 The micro-based efficiency function is reported in equation (9) of Campbell (2006). In choosing 
parameters for the micro-based efficiency function, it is also necessary to specify values for the interest rate, 
the proportion of workers who are dismissed, the probability of an exogenous separation, and the ratio 
between unemployment benefits and average wages. It is assumed that the interest rate is 1% per quarter, the 
proportion of workers dismissed is 1% per quarter, the probability of an exogenous separation is 3.5% per 
quarter, and the ratio between unemployment benefits and average wages is 0.35. Values for the exogenous 
separation probability and the dismissal probability were determined from estimated separation probabilities 
in several previous studies. The value for the replacement ratio is the average of the replacement rate figures 
in Appendix Table 1a of Blanchflower and Oswald (2005).  
23 Equations (16a) and (16b) are obtained by setting ν1 and ν2 equal to 1 in equations (12a) and (12b). In 
addition, equations (17a) and (17b) are obtained by setting ν1=ν2 =1 in equation (6a).  
24 The fact that 1ˆ2 =β means that the regression equation can be expressed as tttt duWW εβ +=− − 11 ˆˆˆ . 
Since tWˆ  and 1ˆ −tW  are the percentage differences in wages from their initial values, the difference between 
them is the percentage change in wages between period t-1 and period t. 
25 In Campbell and Kamlani’s (1997) survey of compensation professionals, the overwhelming majority 
of respondents expected that workers’ effort and morale would be worse if their firm cut wages in the current 
year than if their firm had historically paid lower wages (controlling for the current value of the wage). 
Bewley’s (1994, p. 10) survey found that “the connection that employers report is between morale and wage 
decreases, not between morale and wage levels.” Kahneman et al. (1986, p. 730) interpret responses to their 
survey as indicating that “the current wage of an employee serves as reference for evaluating the fairness of 
future adjustments of that employee’s wage.” In addition, Clark (1999) finds that reported job satisfaction is 
more closely related to wage changes than to wage levels. 
26 Predicted coefficients were calculated both with the naïve and micro-based efficiency functions and 
with specifications in which workers’ satisfaction depends linearly and nonlinearly on wage changes. The 
coefficient lies between -0.713 and -1.10 when efficiency is assumed to depend on absolute wage changes and 
between -0.870 and -1.22 when it is assumed to depend on relative wage changes. The derivations of the 
models in which efficiency depends on wage changes are quite complex. For the case in which efficiency 
depends on relative wage changes, a derivation of the model is available at   
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www.niu.edu/econ/Directory/campbell.shtml under the heading, “Phillips Curve Model.” A dependence of 
efficiency on wage changes may also raise the coefficient on lagged wages in a wage curve, resulting in a 
more realistic predicted coefficient than in the baseline case.  
27 The aggregate and regional demand shocks are both assumed to have a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 0.0075. Regional wages and unemployment in each time period are calculated with an iterative 
procedure. The paths of wages and unemployment in each region are first calculated from equations (9) and 
(10) (with the θt’s depending on the sums of the regional and aggregate shocks) under the assumption that 
N
tΩˆ  (expectations of aggregate wages) and 
N
tdu  (aggregate unemployment) equal 0. The calculated values of 
wages, lagged wages, and unemployment in each region are then averaged to construct new values for NtΩˆ  
and Ntdu . With these new values of 
N
tΩˆ  and 
N
tdu , new paths for regional wages and unemployment are 
calculated from equations (9) and (10). The process is continued until the difference between regional wages 
in each time period converges to within 10-6 in successive iterations. 
28 This equation implies that ν1 and ν2 would fall from 0.5 to 0.4 in a region whose unemployment rate is 
five percentage points above the national average.  
29 Equations (6a) and (6b) also make predictions about the values of the coefficients on aggregate wages 
and unemployment (although empirically estimated wage curves generally include time dummies rather than 
aggregate variables). If the ν’s depend on uR-uN, the coefficients on aggregate wages and unemployment may 
be different from these predicted values. To examine how these coefficients are affected by this dependence, 
simulated data were used in a regression of regional wages on regional unemployment, lagged regional wages, 
aggregate unemployment, and expected aggregate wages. With the log-level regression, the average 
coefficients on aggregate wages and unemployment are close to their predicted values. With the log-log 
regression, the coefficients are very sensitive to the specification for aggregate unemployment. If aggregate 
unemployment is entered as either a level or a log, the coefficients on aggregate wages and unemployment are 
not close to their predicted values, and the R2 is relatively low. (In fact, consistent with Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1994, p. 212), the average coefficient on the log of aggregate unemployment is positive.) However, 
when the level and square of aggregate unemployment are included, the average coefficients are much closer 
to their predicted values, and the average R2 is 0.999. These results suggest that the relationship between 
regional wages and aggregate unemployment is nonlinear, but that the log of aggregate unemployment does 
not effectively capture the nonlinearity. 
30 The reasons why this equation has a perfect fit are that the model is linearized around its steady-state 
equilibrium and that, on average, firms in a region are assumed to operate exactly on their labor demand 
curves in each period. Obviously, actual economies are probably nonlinear, and it is unlikely that firms will 
operate exactly on their labor demand curves, even when aggregated over an entire region. Thus, the perfect 
fit in this model should not be taken to imply that wage curves from actual economies should perfectly fit the 
data on wages and unemployment. However, actual wage curves estimated with average regional wages often 
do exhibit R2’s above 0.99. (See, for example, Tables 4.26-4.29 of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994).)  
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Table 1 
Estimated wage equations 
Baseline parameters: ν1=0.5, ν2=0.5, ω=0.5, u=0.06,  e=0.8, eW=0.8, eu(u/e) =0.05. 
  








ββ     
elasticity
runLong






Baseline  -0.0750 0.333 -0.1125 -0.0499 0.333 -0.0748 
 
ω=0.25 -0.0643 0.429 -0.1125 -0.0428 0.429 -0.0748 
 
ω=0.75 -0.0900 0.200 -0.1125 -0.0599 0.200 -0.0748 
 
u=0.045 -0.0750 0.333 -0.1125 -0.0429 0.333 -0.0643 
 
u=0.075 -0.0750 0.333 -0.1125 -0.0562 0.333 -0.0843 
 
e=0.70 -0.0810 0.333 -0.1214 -0.0519 0.333 -0.0779 
 
e=0.85 -0.0725 0.333 -0.1088 -0.0480 0.333 -0.0720 
 
eu(u/e) =0.04 -0.0600 0.333 -0.0900 -0.0473 0.333 -0.0709 
 
eu(u/e) =0.06 -0.0900 0.333 -0.1350 -0.0528 0.333 -0.0791  
 
ν1=0.3  -0.0662 0.176 -0.0804 -0.0440 0.176 -0.0534 
 
ν1=0.7  -0.0865 0.538 -0.1875 -0.0576 0.538 -0.1247 
 
ν2=0.3  -0.0450 0.333 -0.0675 -0.0299 0.333 -0.0449 
 
ν2=0.7  -0.1050 0.333 -0.1575 -0.0698 0.333 -0.1048 
 
ν1=ν2=0.3  -0.0397 0.176 -0.0482 -0.0264 0.176 -0.0321 
 
ν1=ν2=0.7  -0.1211 0.538 -0.2625 -0.0806 0.538 -0.1746 
 
ν1=0.6, ν2=0.4 -0.0643 0.429 -0.1125 -0.0428 0.429 -0.0748 
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Table 2a* 
Estimated wage equations 
Dependent variable: regional wages 
 1 2 3 4 









































# obs. 200 200 200 200 
* The top number is the average value across all 50 simulations, and the numbers in parentheses 




Estimated wage equations 
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 1 2 3 4 









































# obs. 200 200 200 200 
* The top number is the average value across all 50 simulations, and the numbers in 





Estimated wage equations 
Dependent variable: aggregate wages 










# obs. 20 
* The top number is the average value across all 50 simulations, and the numbers in 




Estimated wage equations 
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# obs. 200 200 200 200 
* The top number is the average value across all 50 simulations, and the numbers in 
parentheses are the lowest and highest values (in absolute values) in the simulations. 
 
 
